In their first press statement since sworn in, the new National Election Commission has announced that the constitutionally mandated presidential elections scheduled for November 13th will be delayed. The Commission stated that elections will be held in nine months starting on October 1st, and cited time, technical and financial constraints as the reason for the delaying.
Somaliland National Electrol Commission scheduled to conduct the Presidential Election in 9 months, starting 1st October 2022, as the current scheduled date of 13 Nov, 2022 is not viable due to time, technical and financial constrains.
— Somaliland National Electoral Commission (SLNEC) (@SLNECHQ) September 24, 2022
The selections, confirmation by parliament, and swearing-in of the new National Election Commissioners have dragged on for months and were completed on September 7th, 2022. The previous Election Commission, led by Mr. Abdirashid Riyoraac, dissolved following a dispute among the commissioners and an accusation of corruption that prompted an investigation by the Auditor General’s Office.
The opposition has accused President Bihi of orchestrating the disbandment of the election commission to ensure elections are not held on time. President Bihi has countered the opposition’s accusation that the delay was caused by opposition members of parliament who failed to confirm replacement commissioners.
The opposition parties of Waddani and UCID have welcomed the statement from the Election Commission, although they have in the past opposed presidential term extension and staged protests where at least six civilians were killed and scores injured. It is unclear if the argument of which election, presidential or national political parties, comes first is settled between the President and the leaders of the opposition parties.
President Bihi has argued that the new parties currently amid registration are the only ones eligible to take part in Presidential Elections, whereas the opposition parties have argued that the President is trying to eliminate the current opposition parties and that the presidential elections come first.
Earlier this week, Members of Parliament approved a motion to amend the election laws Number 91/2022 and Number 14. The amendment ratified the combination of presidential and political party elections where the presidential elections will be participated by Waddani, UCID, and the ruling party of Kulmiye and the other parallel election will decide which of the new or existing parties will qualify as a national political party. Somaliland law stipulates that only three political parties can exist for a term of ten years. It is unclear if the Senate and President will approve the proposed amendment to codify it into law.
The National Election Commission’s statement that it cannot hold the presidential elections on November 13th, 2022 paves the way for the Somaliland Senate, which has the constitutional power to extend the presidential term to start deliberation and approve term extension for President Muse Bihi Abdi. In the past, the Senate has ignored the extension period recommended by the Election Commission and has given past Presidents two-year term extensions. This will be the sixth time presidential elections are delayed in Somaliland.
Despite the normalization of election delays and pitched political disputes in election season, Somaliland has earned high praises for its ability to hold one-person, one-vote elections and peaceful transfers of power. It is unclear if the latest delays in presidential elections and continued political jostling will effect in its quest for international recognition.
On December 28, 2018, Turkey named its former Ambassador to Somalia Dr. Olgan Bekar as a Special Envoy for Somalia and Somaliland Talks. Thought the former Ambassador to Somalia has had limited contact with the Government of Somaliland especially President Bihi’s current administration, he known to be very comfortable in navigating the political scene in Mogadishu.
In this report, we are examining Turkey’s history in Somaliland and Somalia and their role as mediators in the past talks.
Dr. Olgan Bekar, Turkey’s Special Envoy for Somaliland – Somalia with President Muse Bihi Abdi
Turkey is not the only country interested to have Somaliland and Somalia get back to the negotiating table and reach some sort of a settlement.
The topic has come up during President Muse Bihi Abdi’s meeting with the Ethiopian Prime Minister in Addis Ababa this week though it is unclear the extent to which they discussed the subject or if any concrete steps to get the two sides talking were agreed upon.
Somaliland and Ethiopian leaders meeting in Addis Ababa
It is important to understand that various stake holders have different expected outcomes of such talks and Somaliland might be the odd man out as it seeks to gain an amicable completion of its divorce from Somalia.
According to statement from Somaliland Presidency following President Bihi’s meeting with the new envoy Dr. Bekar on February 9, The President informed Dr. Bekar and the Turkish delegation that since past talks has not yielded any results all future dialogue between Somaliland and Somalia must include the international community.
Sources from Somaliland’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation present in the meeting with the President and the Turkish delegation stated that President Bihi also informed the Turkish envoy that bringing a level of balance in how Turkey invests in Somalia and Somaliland is a good way to show Somaliland that Turkey is impartial and a friend to Somaliland.
To understand if Turkey can be an impartial and an honest broker on Somaliland and Somalia talks and its general standing in the world community, we have spoken to Mr. Michael Rubin who is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, where he researches Arab politics, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Iran, Iraq, the Kurds, terrorism, and Turkey.
President Bihi with Michael Rubin and Presidential Economic Advisor Dr. Osman Sh Ahmed
Somaliland Chronicle: Do you think it is wise for Somaliland to accept Turkey as a mediator in Somalia talks given the Turkish Gov support and massive investment in Somalia?
Mr. Rubin: Turkey does not have a track-record as an honest broker, and President Erdoğan has an ideological agenda which does not value Somaliland’s democracy and security. It is crucial to broaden any such mediation beyond a single country.
Somaliland Chronicle: In your latest article you wrote about Turkish support for terrorism and specifically for Al-Shabaab. What is Turkey’s reasoning for supporting Al-Shabaab?
Mr. Rubin: There is no single international definition of terrorism, and so Turkey often says it is combating terrorism, but denies groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia or Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in Mali are terrorists. Erdoğan’s goal is a more Islamist order. His fault, though, is confusing some Islamist movements with Islam itself.
Somaliland Chronicle: President Bihi recently met with a Turkish Envoy in charge of the Somaliland/Somalia talks, do you see any value in having Turkey to mediate or be part of those talks?
Mr. Rubin: Certainly, there is value in consultation with Turkey, as Turkey retains a diplomatic presence in both Somalia and Somaliland. President Bihi is correct, however, to seek a broader mediation rather than reliance on a single country.
As President Bihi informed the Turkish delegation, there is an imbalance in how Turkey provides and and invests in Somaliland and Somalia. Let’s break down what Turkey so far done in is to Somalia:
Turkey in Somalia
Security Influence
Turkey is Somalia’s true patron state, one of its most expensive efforts is to rebuild the Somali National Army from scratch and in its own image.
The largest military force in Somalia is of course AMISOM but Turkey’s military presence dwarfs that of any individual country in the AMISOM troops stationed in Somalia. In fact, Turkey’s largest military installation outside of Turkey is in Mogadishu.
Dr. Olgan Bekar with Somalia’s Prime Minister Hassan Khaire.
The 1.5 square mile Turkish military training installation is capable of churning out 1,500 fully trained and equipped soldiers at a time. This is according to Turkish and Somali sources familiar with the facility.
Below is a tweet from Turkish Embassy in Somalia showing images of Somali military personnel being trained in Turkey.
While Turkey rates as the 18th largest military in expenditure globally, it has a fledgling arms industry and rebuilding the Somali National Army represents a lucrative opportunity to supply it with the equipment it is manufacturing.
According to a recent VOA report, in what seems to be a clear violation of the United Nations Security Council’s weapons embargo on Somalia, Turkey has been supplying armament to units of the Somali National Army it has been training.
Public records show that Albayrak Group does not have a track record in managing world class ports, besides Mogadishu Port, it also manages and the Trabzon Port in the Black Sea on Turkey’s Northern border with Georgia.
Compared to Albayrak Group and the 2 ports it manages, DP World manages about 77 marine and inland terminals including Somaliland’s Berbera Port.
Other Turkish conglomerates such Enez-İnşaat and Kozuva Group are also active in Mogadishu.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport has been managed by a Kozuva subsidiery, Favori Airports LLC,since September 2013.
Mogadishu’s Aden Abdulle Airport
Here is the Somali Prime Minister Mr. Hassan Khaire thanking Qatar for funding road networks between Mogadishu, Afgoye and Jawhar and also thanking the Turkish Government, presumably Enez-İnşaat who according to him have “won” the contract to build said roads.
Turkey bills itself as Somalia’s rescuer and multiple visits by Erdoğan to Somalia especially in what is considered a relatively difficult time for the Somali people were designed to convey that exact message but economically, Turkey stands to gain more from Somalia and Mogadishu than it lets on.
Erdoğan and his wife in Mogadishu.
According to some estimates, the most profitable route in Turkish Airlines is the Mogadishu – Ankara route. And aside from the large visible projects, there are tens of thousands of Turkish citizens living and working in Mogadishu.
Getting involved in one of the least stable country in the world, Turkey is employing the concept of first mover advantage. This means less competition from the Chinese and other actors vying for influence in Africa.
Turkey heavy bet on Somalia and specifically Mogadishu is yielding economic results for Turkey beyond what Erdoğan has expected. In fact, Turkey’s largest embassy in the world is not where you would expect, like Washington DC, Brussels or Berlin, it is in Mogadishu, Somalia.
One of the most attractive features of Turkey’s patronage of Somalia is it is non-interference posture in Somalia’s domestic politics. It is worth nothing that Somalia ranked lowest in global corruption index and any country that is willing to look the other way is a welcome reprieve from the usual admonishment for President Farmajo’s weak administration.
Although this particular instance has been widely publicized by TIKA, Somaliland Chronicle has been unable to locate anything of note done in Somaliland either by Turkish Government or it is aid agency TIKA.
There are, however, multiple unfulfilled pledges by the Turkish Government in the past to help build roads in Somaliland according to multiple former and current Somaliland Government officials. None of these pledges have materialized.
One thing of note is that Turkey has been particularly adept in dangling a carrot of aid and development or simply inviting them to Istanbul on a whirlwind of meetings and tours to get them to buy into the importance of Somaliland and Somalia talks.
No other country has put so much effort to try to mediate Somaliland and Somalia as much as Turkey. In fact, this might be the only thing Turkey has done in Somaliland. There were many rounds of talks that hosted by the Turks in the past and personally supervised by President Erdoğan himself, unfortunately, these talks have been a disaster for Somaliland.
Turkey’s obsession with Somaliland is rooted in the simple fact that the rift between Gulf states of UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side and Qatar, Turkey and Iran on one side has been playing out in Somaliland and Somalia.
President of Somaliland HE Muse Bihi Abdi and DP World CEO Mr. Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem
The United Arab Emirates base in Berbera and DP World managing the Port gives the UAE and its ally Saudi Arabia an advantage and a foothold in the strategic 850 kilometers of Red Sea coastline with a direct access to Bab Al-mandab.
Turkey and Qatar has been spending heavily in trying to unseat the Emirates from both the military base and the Berbera Port by mobilizing the Somali government to oppose these deals. Additionally, Turkey has been advancing particular talking points that have been seeping into public discourse in Somaliland such as the importance of Somaliland – Somalia talks, the ramifications of hosting a foreign army in Somaliland via the UAE base and the deterioration of service at the Berbera Port. These same exact talking points are parroted by many civil organizations and opposition parties in Somaliland.
Somaliland has repeatedly signaled it’s willingness to talk to Somalia but its demand for the international community including the United States, United Kingdom and the European Union to get involved and President Bihi’s impossible task for the Turks to raise their level of support for Somaliland to something comparable to Somalia’s almost guarantees that Turkey’s role will be a lot smaller in future dialogue between the two countries.
As Ismaïl Omar Guelleh’s once-iron grip on Djibouti loosens, the Horn of Africa teeters on the brink of upheaval. Whispers of the president’s failing health have begun to circulate through diplomatic channels, lending an air of urgency to discussions about the country’s future. While such rumors are often exaggerated in the world of geopolitics, they serve as a stark reminder of an immutable truth: Guelleh, like all mortals, will one day depart the stage. This inescapable reality casts a long shadow over Djibouti’s political landscape, forcing regional and global powers to confront the implications of a post-Guelleh era.
The potential power vacuum left by Guelleh’s eventual exit threatens to unleash a perfect storm of domestic instability and international power plays that could reshape the geopolitical landscape far beyond Djibouti’s borders. Guelleh’s regime, while repressive, has maintained a delicate balance between ethnic factions, foreign interests, and economic pressures. However, Guelleh’s failure to craft a coherent succession plan—a political testament—has left Djibouti exposed to chaos. This oversight leaves the nation vulnerable to chaos and opportunism in the wake of his departure, whether through natural causes or political upheaval.
In the aftermath of Guelleh, both the U.S. and China will likely vie to install their favored proxies at the helm of the government. Yet this power struggle will only serve to exacerbate Djibouti’s already volatile domestic situation. As these giants compete for influence, the country risks descending into political fragmentation, economic stagnation, and potentially, civil unrest. The U.S., having focused solely on maintaining military dominance without investing in local governance or economic resilience, could find itself marginalized in Djibouti’s next chapter. China, with its calculated approach, may exploit this vacuum, tightening its grip on the region.
The fragility of Djibouti’s political system cannot be overstated. Guelleh’s iron-fisted rule has systematically eroded the country’s institutions, leaving them ill-equipped to manage a transfer of power. The judiciary is a tool of the regime. The electoral commission is a mere rubber stamp. Even the military, traditionally a stabilizing force in many African nations, is a wild card. Guelleh has cultivated personal loyalty among its leadership, raising the specter of factional infighting or even a coup in his absence.
Lurking beneath the surface are simmering ethnic tensions. The majority Issa and minority Afar communities have a history of conflict, kept in check by Guelleh’s calculated balance of power. His exit could reignite these divisions, plunging the country into unrest. The stakes extend far beyond Djibouti’s borders, threatening regional stability and global trade routes.
Djibouti’s escalating debt to China, now over 70% of its GDP, has shackled the nation to Beijing’s economic will, placing it on the brink of economic collapse. Despite IMF warnings, Guelleh’s borrowing spree continues, playing into China’s ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ through projects like the Doraleh Port. This strategic asset could fall under Beijing’s control, granting China unprecedented leverage over one of the world’s most crucial maritime chokepoints. The ability to monitor or potentially interfere with maritime traffic at the mouth of the Red Sea would be a strategic coup for China, shifting power dynamics not just in the Horn of Africa, but across the Middle East and beyond.
Meanwhile, the U.S. now stands on the verge of strategic obsolescence, its influence fading in the shadow of China’s rise. Years of myopic focus on counterterrorism in Somalia have left Washington unprepared for the complexities of a post-Guelleh Djibouti. The State Department’s Africa Affairs division and AFRICOM’s lack of strategic foresight have resulted in a policy vacuum. While the U.S. has been fixated on maintaining its military foothold at Camp Lemonnier, China has been playing a long game of economic and political influence.
France, long Djibouti’s primary ally and protector, finds itself treading a delicate line between maintaining its foothold and resisting China’s expanding reach. Recent developments underscore the precariousness of America’s position. Djibouti’s increasingly erratic foreign policy moves, particularly its tacit support for Houthi forces, have sent shockwaves through diplomatic circles. This apparent realignment threatens to transform Djibouti from a stabilizing force in the region to a potential enabler of maritime insecurity. Rumors of Guelleh’s government imposing restrictions on AFRICOM’s operational capabilities suggest a deliberate effort to constrain the U.S. military’s ability to project power.
Adding to this complex tableau is the rise of the Republic of Somaliland, Djibouti’s neighbor to the south. Somaliland’s ascent threatens to redraw the Horn of Africa’s geopolitical map. With Ethiopia poised to reroute trade to Berbera, Djibouti’s lifeblood—its control over regional commerce—could be drained. The UAE’s investment in Berbera is as much about countering Turkish influence in Somalia as it is about economic opportunity. As Somaliland gains clout, pressure for international recognition may grow, potentially redrawing the political map of the Horn of Africa.
As Djibouti approaches the inevitable end of Guelleh’s rule, the stakes could not be higher. What happens next will ripple across the region, shaping the balance of power not only in the Horn of Africa but in the global corridors of trade and influence. The battle for Djibouti’s future will be fought on multiple fronts – political, economic, and strategic. The outcome of this struggle will have profound implications not just for the Horn of Africa, but for global trade and power dynamics. As Guelleh’s reign draws to a close, the world must brace for turbulence in this small but pivotal nation. The question is not whether change will come to Djibouti, but what form it will take and who will shape it. The answer may well determine the future of East Africa and beyond.
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Somaliland Chronicle is responsible for the content of this editorial.
Somaliland Supreme Court vacated the case against MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf on constitutional grounds.
The court ruled that MP Abib’s arrest and detention violated parliamentary immunity protections.
The decision focused on procedural violations, not on the merits of accusations against MP Abib.
The case has significant implications for the separation of powers in Somaliland’s developing democracy.
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of Somaliland has ruled on a case involving Member of Parliament Mohamed Abib Yusuf, bringing to the forefront critical questions about the extent of parliamentary immunity and the separation of powers. The verdict, delivered on September 30, 2024, addresses the constitutional boundaries between legislative privilege and executive authority, marking a significant moment in Somaliland’s ongoing democratic development.
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The case, numbered MSD/DDL/03/2024, originated when the House of Representatives challenged the executive branch’s decision to arrest MP Abib on September 2, 2024, upon his return from Dubai. The House argued that this action violated the constitutional protections of parliamentary immunity, setting the stage for a legal battle that would test the balance of power between government branches.
At the heart of the dispute were Articles 49 and 79 of the Somaliland Constitution, which outline legal procedures for MPs and specify conditions for suspending parliamentary immunity. The case’s complexity deepened with the filing of a habeas corpus petition under Article 66 of the Criminal Procedure Code, challenging the legality of MP Abib’s detention.
Chief Justice Adam Haji Ali Ahmed, leading a full bench of nine justices, presided over this constitutional showdown. The court’s ruling found that the procedures for arresting and detaining MP Abib failed to meet constitutional requirements, declaring the detention unconstitutional due to improper procedures and disregard for parliamentary immunity.
Notably, the court’s decision sidestepped the question of MP Abib’s guilt or innocence, focusing instead on the procedural and constitutional violations in his arrest and detention. This approach underscored the court’s role in upholding constitutional processes rather than adjudicating the merits of specific allegations against a legislator.
The executive branch, represented by the Deputy Minister of Interior, had argued that the serious nature of the allegations against MP Abib justified suspending his immunity. They claimed that Abib had engaged in activities detrimental to Somaliland’s stability, including meetings with individuals allegedly intent on destabilizing the region. This stance highlighted the tension between national security concerns and constitutional protections for elected officials.
The Supreme Court’s focus on procedural violations rather than the substance of the accusations opens up intriguing legal questions. It potentially leaves room for future legal action, raising questions about double jeopardy in Somaliland’s legal system. Could prosecutors, adhering to proper procedures, bring a new case based on the original allegations? Or does this ruling, despite its procedural nature, preclude further prosecution on these charges? The answers could significantly impact the balance between constitutional protections and prosecutorial powers in Somaliland.
This case unfolds against a backdrop of broader concerns about Somaliland’s judicial system, particularly under the current administration. Critics have pointed to a pattern of what they describe as extrajudicial arrests, where serious charges are often dropped without explanation days later. The MP Abib case, while distinct, has reignited these discussions about the role of the judiciary in safeguarding constitutional rights.
The political context adds another layer of complexity, with the case occurring just months before Somaliland’s crucial November 2024 presidential and political party elections. The House of Representatives’ decision to bring this case to the Constitutional Court underscores the legislature’s assertive role in the checks and balances system.
However, the parliament’s actions have not been without critics. Some government officials and political commentators have accused the legislature of protecting its members at the expense of national security considerations. This debate highlights the ongoing challenge of balancing institutional prerogatives with broader national interests.
As Somaliland navigates these complex issues, the MP Abib case serves as an important indicator of the system’s capacity for self-correction and adherence to constitutional principles. While broader concerns about judicial independence persist, this ruling demonstrates the potential for the judiciary to act as an arbiter between the legislative and executive branches.
In the wake of the ruling, both the government and MP Abib have remained reticent. The Ministry of Interior and the Attorney General’s office have yet to comment on the decision or Abib’s release. Abib himself, upon regaining his freedom, briefly addressed the media but refrained from discussing his detention, promising a more comprehensive statement at a later date.
As Somaliland continues to develop its democratic institutions, this ruling affirms the nation’s commitment to constitutional governance. It underscores the delicate balance between national security concerns and the rule of law, a balance crucial for Somaliland’s stability and democratic growth. The coming months will likely reveal the full impact of this case on the nation’s legal and political landscape, potentially reshaping the dynamics between the three branches of government in this evolving democracy.
The Government of the Republic of China (Taiwan) has taken a significant step in supporting Somaliland’s democratic journey by committing $2 million for the upcoming 2024 Presidential and Party elections. This funding, announced by Ambassador Allen Lou, aims to reinforce Somaliland’s electoral process, advancing transparency, accountability, and fairness. The Ministry of Finance will transfer the funds to Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC).
This commitment builds on Taiwan’s previous contribution to Somaliland’s electoral infrastructure in 2021, when it provided funds for an Iris Biometric Voter Verification System (IBVVS) during the parliamentary and local government elections. While technical issues prevented its full deployment at the time, Somaliland’s political parties have now agreed to use the system in six cities for the upcoming elections. Taiwan’s Ministry of Finance will transfer the funds to Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) to facilitate this process.
“Taiwan is proud to collaborate with the Somaliland government, especially NEC, to advance transparency, accountability, fairness, and trust in the 2024 Presidential and Party elections,” said the Taiwanese Representative in Somaliland Ambassador Lou.
The IBVVS, designed to enhance voter verification and reduce fraud, combines traditional voter cards with advanced iris scan technology. Somaliland’s National Election Commission states that the system ensures no voter is registered more than once. However, the introduction of this technology has sparked debate within Somaliland. While President Muse Bihi Abdi’s Kulmiye party strongly supports the system as a safeguard against election fraud, opposition groups such as the Waddani party have raised concerns about potential delays and voter disenfranchisement. Logistical challenges in deploying the technology in remote regions have also been highlighted as potential issues.
The Taiwan-Somaliland partnership, established in 2020, has faced opposition from both China and Somalia. Beijing, adhering to its “One China” policy, views Taiwan’s international outreach, particularly in Africa, as a challenge to its sovereignty claims. Similarly, the Somali government, which does not recognize Somaliland’s independence, has criticized the partnership. Despite these pressures, both Taiwan and Somaliland have maintained a strong relationship built on shared democratic values and mutual interests.
In addition to financial and sectoral cooperation, Taiwan has offered democratic expertise. In January 2024, Taiwan invited NEC officials to observe its own Presidential and Parliamentary elections, giving Somaliland’s election authorities an opportunity to learn from Taiwan’s advanced electoral systems. A high-level Somaliland delegation, including the Vice President of the Guurti and members of the House of Representatives, also attended the inauguration ceremony of Taiwan’s 16th President and Vice President in May 2024.
The cooperation between Taiwan and Somaliland extends far beyond electoral support, encompassing critical sectors such as healthcare, education, agriculture, and technology:
Healthcare: Taiwan has provided crucial support to Somaliland’s public health infrastructure, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes the delivery of medical supplies, personal protective equipment (PPE), and testing kits. Taiwan has also sent medical teams to Somaliland, offering expertise in disease prevention and healthcare management.
Agriculture: Taiwan has partnered with Somaliland on projects aimed at improving food security and increasing agricultural productivity. These initiatives include technical training for farmers, introduction of modern farming techniques, and support for water conservation and irrigation systems.
Education: Taiwan offers scholarships to Somaliland students, enabling them to pursue higher education in fields such as engineering, science, and information technology. This program equips young Somalilanders with skills crucial for their country’s development.
Technology: Beyond the electoral biometric system, Taiwan has been involved in strengthening Somaliland’s IT infrastructure. This includes the development of e-governance systems and cybersecurity measures, aimed at modernizing public services and enhancing administrative efficiency.
As Ambassador Lou noted, “Freedom and democracy constitute the fundamental values that connect Taiwan and Somaliland to the international community.” This multifaceted collaboration reflects Taiwan’s deep commitment to Somaliland’s development, demonstrating a shared vision of progress, modernization, and stability.
As Somaliland prepares for its 2024 elections, Taiwan’s contributions, both financial and technical, underscore the growing strength of this unique partnership. Their relationship serves as a model for international cooperation, particularly in regions striving for greater democratic governance and sustainable development.
In a land where loyalty to Somaliland is expected to be unwavering, the spectacle of its leaders pardoning traitors with ease is both shocking and demoralizing. The latest farce—Osman Aw Mohamud Buurmadow’s grand return—starkly reveals the systemic hypocrisy undermining our nation’s sovereignty. Mr. Mohamud, a self-styled king colloquially known as Boqor Buurmadow, was welcomed with pomp befitting a monarch rather than the scorn his treachery demands. This turncoat, having shamelessly sold his birthright for a mess of pottage in Mogadishu, finds himself not only absolved but embraced as a returning hero.
Although President Bihi is said to be highly allergic to folks who go to Mogadishu, his actions tell a different story. The president’s capitulation to tribal pressures while violating the rule of law reflects the broader inconsistencies in Somaliland’s political approach. This debacle reveals the farcical nature of our governance, where leaders claim to fight treason yet rehabilitate the very individuals who have betrayed us.
Is this the Somaliland for which our forebears fought and bled? Did they envision a nation where betrayal is not just forgiven but celebrated?
The Pardoning of Traitors
This revolving door to Mogadishu extends far beyond Buurmadow. Consider the cases of Somalia’s former Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamed Omar Arte, and former Minister of Finance, Abdirahman Duale Beyle. Both men, after serving a government actively working to undermine Somaliland, were granted unconditional pardons upon their return. In a world where Somalia seeks to obliterate our claim to sovereignty, these pardons send a chilling message: betrayal isn’t just tolerated—it’s our new national industry.
Even more repugnant are those who openly supported forces fighting against Somaliland in Las Anod, ghoulishly reveling in the deaths of our fallen soldiers. That these despicable individuals will likely be next in line for state pardons is not just a failure of governance—it’s an unforgivable betrayal of every drop of blood spilled in the name of our independence.
The Role of Tribal Politics
This farce is not merely a stain on our political landscape; it is a metastasizing cancer, eating away at the very foundations of our aspiring nation. The rot extends far beyond the gilded corridors of power in Hargeisa. Our populace, afflicted by a deeply entrenched tribal mindset, bears its share of culpability in this national disgrace. This collective malady sees large swathes of the public rallying behind their clan’s standard-bearers, regardless of the reprehensible acts these individuals may have committed. It’s as if we’ve replaced our national conscience with a tribal slot machine, always ready to pay out loyalty to the lowest bidder.
Both the ruling Kulmiye Party and the Waddani Opposition Party view Buurmadow not as a traitor but as a pawn in their quest for power. Their eagerness to court this self-styled “king” is nothing short of a national disgrace, revealing a sickening display of moral bankruptcy where those who betray Somaliland are elevated to positions of influence, while the nation’s genuine patriots are left to watch in horror.
The Complicity of Businesses
Why has Somaliland consistently failed to rein in businesses that actively undermine it – enterprises that eagerly follow directives from Mogadishu, erasing our very existence from their systems? The answer lies in the same poisoned well from which these endless pardons are drawn. Our leaders, those compromised custodians of our national interest, care more for securing personal loans or acquiring the latest luxury vehicles than safeguarding the nation’s dignity. They have traded their duty for comfort, their integrity for a handful of shillings.
Inconsistency in Applying Justice
To illustrate a broader point about consistency in justice, consider the case of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf. While we take no position on the merits of his arrest, it serves as a stark contrast to other recent events, laying bare glaring inconsistencies in Somaliland’s approach to national security. A sitting parliamentarian now faces imprisonment on treason allegations, while individuals who have openly aligned with Somaliland’s enemies walk free, even celebrated as heroes upon their return.
This dichotomy – swift action against an MP versus leniency for known collaborators – exposes a troubling selectivity in the application of justice by Somaliland’s political elite. If safeguarding national interests is truly the priority, how can we reconcile such disparate treatment? These apparent double standards suggest a system where political expediency, rather than consistent principles, governs the course of justice. Such practices not only undermine the rule of law but also corrode the very foundations of national integrity that Somaliland’s leaders claim to uphold.
The Path Forward
Somaliland’s leadership today stands as a monument to moral bankruptcy—too timid to fight for real independence, too compromised to deliver justice, and too myopic to see beyond the next election cycle. But let us not absolve ourselves, the public, of blame. Our unwavering devotion to tribalism has fertilized the soil in which these betrayals flourish. We have become willing accomplices in our own national sabotage.
If Somaliland is to break free from this cycle of treachery, it must not only purge itself of these Janus-faced leaders but also excise the tribal tumor that has metastasized throughout our body politic. We, the citizens, must awaken from our clan-induced stupor and confront an uncomfortable truth: every time we support a traitor for the sake of tribal loyalty, we drive another nail into the coffin of our national aspirations.
The stakes could not be higher. A nation cannot survive, let alone thrive, when betrayal is its most lucrative export. Somaliland’s very existence as a sovereign entity hangs in the balance. Our current path leads not to independence and prosperity, but to a future as a footnote in history—a cautionary tale of a dream squandered on the altar of tribal politics and personal greed.
This is Somaliland’s moment of reckoning. Will we continue to embrace this revolving door of treachery, watching helplessly as our so-called leaders shuttle back and forth to Mogadishu? Or will we slam it shut, bolt it, and throw away the key? The path forward demands nothing less than a complete reconstruction of our political culture, a vehement rejection of tribal politics, and a renewed commitment to placing our national interests above all else.
Only then can we hope to build the Somaliland our founders envisioned—a nation governed by leaders worthy of the torch they bear, supported by a populace united not by clan, but by an unwavering commitment to true independence and shared prosperity. The choice, as ever, remains ours to make. Let us choose wisely, for the ghosts of our betrayed past and the specters of our threatened future are watching.
In a bold diplomatic move, the government of Somaliland has ordered the closure of the Egyptian Cultural Center in Hargeisa, its capital. Dr. Essa Kayd, Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, cited “national security” concerns as he announced a 72-hour deadline for all staff to depart the country.
An anonymous government official further elaborated on these concerns, stating that the center was allegedly involved in activities that threatened Somaliland’s national security. “We have evidence that certain individuals associated with the Egyptian Cultural Center were engaging in espionage and other activities that compromised our national interests,” the official revealed .
This decisive action marks a significant departure from Somaliland’s traditionally cautious foreign policy approach. Known for its diplomatic restraint, even in the face of complex regional dynamics, Somaliland has historically refrained from such overt measures against foreign entities operating within its borders. The closure of the Egyptian facility stands in stark contrast to Somaliland’s treatment of other nations with similar regional engagements, notably Turkey, whose diplomatic mission in Hargeisa remains operational despite its defense pact with Somalia mirroring that of Egypt.
The timing of this decision is particularly noteworthy, coinciding with Egypt’s recent defense agreement with Somalia and speculation about Cairo’s potential involvement in post-ATMIS (African Union Transition Mission in Somalia) stabilization efforts. These developments have stirred unease among neighboring states, with some observers suggesting that Egypt aims to fortify its regional position, partly in response to its protracted dispute with Ethiopia over Nile water rights and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project.
At the heart of this regional tension lies the GERD, Ethiopia’s ambitious hydroelectric endeavor on the Blue Nile. Initiated in 2011 and slated to become Africa’s largest power plant of its kind, the dam has been a source of contention between Ethiopia and Egypt. While Ethiopia views the project as vital for its economic growth, Egypt, heavily dependent on the Nile, has expressed grave concerns about potential impacts on its water supply, particularly during the reservoir filling phase.
Adding a significant and positive shift to the geopolitical landscape is the recent Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Somaliland and Ethiopia, finalized in January 2024. This agreement, which grants Ethiopia coveted access to the Red Sea via Somaliland’s port of Berbera, represents a strategic breakthrough for both nations. For Somaliland, it underscores its pivotal role in regional trade and logistics, while for Ethiopia, it opens new avenues for economic growth and enhanced connectivity. Despite sparking opposition from Somalia and concern among regional players like Djibouti, this MoU is seen as a tectonic shift that has the potential to reshape the power dynamics in the Horn of Africa positively. Somaliland’s Foreign Minister Essa Kayd emphasized that the formal agreement cannot be signed without Ethiopia’s recognition of Somaliland, further highlighting the MoU’s significance in the broader geopolitical context.
The Ethiopian-Somaliland partnership potentially aligns Somaliland more closely with Ethiopia in its ongoing Nile water dispute with Egypt. By closing the Egyptian Cultural Center while maintaining relations with other nations that have similar agreements with Somalia, Somaliland demonstrates the nuanced and strategic nature of its foreign policy. This calculated move suggests a delicate balancing act between asserting national interests, managing regional relationships, and positioning itself within broader geopolitical dynamics.
As this situation unfolds, the international community will keenly observe how Somaliland’s bold move affects its regional relationships and broader foreign policy objectives. The closure of the Egyptian Cultural Center, viewed against the backdrop of the Ethiopia MoU and ongoing regional tensions, may herald a new era in Somaliland’s approach to regional diplomacy.
This diplomatic chess move by Somaliland underscores the complex interplay of regional alliances, resource disputes, and the quest for influence that characterizes the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. As the region grapples with these multifaceted challenges, Somaliland’s actions may well serve as a catalyst for broader diplomatic realignments in this strategically critical part of the world.
Arrest of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf: Detained on September 2, 2024, upon returning from Dubai, sparking a fierce debate over parliamentary immunity.
Constitutional Clash: The House of Representatives argues that the arrest violates Article 55 of the Somaliland Constitution, which grants immunity to MPs, while the government cites Article 79(2) allowing suspension of immunity for serious crimes.
Accusations and Defense: The Deputy Minister of Interior claims Abib used immunity for destabilizing activities. The Attorney General defends the arrest but has not specified the charges, raising transparency concerns.
Opposition Reaction: Waddani, Somaliland’s main opposition party, condemns the arrest as politically motivated and calls for Abib’s release.
Election Impact: The arrest comes ahead of November 2024 elections, potentially influencing the political climate and highlighting tensions between Somaliland’s legislative and executive branches.
In a significant development that has sent ripples through Somaliland’s political landscape, the arrest of Member of Parliament Mohamed Abib Yusuf has triggered a fierce legal and constitutional debate between the government and the House of Representatives. The arrest, which has been met with sharp criticism from the legislative body, is now the subject of intense scrutiny as both sides present their arguments.
Adding to the controversy, the Deputy Minister of Interior recently held a press briefing where he accused MP Abib of exploiting parliamentary protection to engage in activities detrimental to Somaliland’s stability. The Deputy Minister claimed that the Parliament’s refusal to suspend Abib’s immunity, as requested by the Attorney General, has emboldened the MP to continue his actions. The Minister further alleged that Abib has met with individuals overseas who are intent on destabilizing Somaliland, and assured that evidence will be presented in due time in a court of law.
On 2nd September 2024, MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf was detained by law enforcement authorities upon his return from Dubai, a move that has since drawn widespread condemnation from the House of Representatives. The parliamentary body has been vocal in its opposition to the arrest, denouncing it as a violation of MP Abib’s parliamentary immunity and accusing the government of overstepping its legal bounds.
In a detailed response dated 3rd September 2024, the House of Representatives issued a letter of protest, in which it strongly rebuked the government’s actions. The letter asserts that MP Abib’s arrest contravenes Article 55 of the Somaliland Constitution, which guarantees immunity to sitting members of Parliament. According to the House, the government’s decision to detain MP Abib without first seeking parliamentary approval represents a blatant disregard for this constitutional protection.
The House’s letter also raises concerns about the principle of double jeopardy, arguing that MP Abib is being subjected to multiple legal actions for the same alleged offenses. The parliamentary body contends that the government’s actions undermine the rule of law and set a dangerous precedent for the treatment of elected officials in Somaliland.
However, the government has responded to these accusations with a robust defense of its actions, articulated through a letter from the Attorney General’s office. Dated 3rd September 2024, the Attorney General’s letter provides a detailed legal justification for the arrest of MP Abib, countering the claims made by the House of Representatives.
According to the Attorney General, the charges against MP Abib are of a serious nature, necessitating the lifting of his parliamentary immunity to allow for legal proceedings. The letter references Article 79(2) of the Somaliland Constitution, which permits the suspension of immunity in cases where a parliamentarian is accused of serious crimes. However, in a move that has further fueled controversy, the letter notably does not specify the exact charges against MP Abib, leaving the nature of the allegations shrouded in mystery. This omission has drawn criticism from various quarters, with some accusing the government of a lack of transparency in handling the case.
The Attorney General’s letter also addresses the issue of double jeopardy, asserting that the charges currently being pursued against MP Abib are distinct from any previous legal actions. The letter emphasizes that the prosecution is based on new evidence and additional allegations, dismissing the House’s concerns as unfounded.
The Attorney General defends the judiciary’s role in the case, stating that the courts are operating within their jurisdiction and that MP Abib’s arrest and detention were carried out in full compliance with Somaliland’s legal standards. The letter stresses the importance of judicial independence, arguing that the judiciary must be allowed to function without interference from the legislative branch to ensure a fair and impartial trial.
Adding to the growing chorus of opposition, Somaliland’s main opposition party, Waddani, has also condemned the arrest of MP Abib. In a statement shared on their official Facebook page, Waddani expressed strong disapproval of the government’s actions, labeling the arrest as politically motivated and a direct attack on parliamentary independence. The party called for the immediate release of MP Abib and urged the government to respect the rule of law and constitutional protections afforded to elected representatives.
The timing of MP Abib’s arrest is particularly significant as it comes just months before Somaliland is set to hold crucial elections in November 2024. These elections are expected to be a pivotal moment in Somaliland’s democratic process, with both local council and presidential elections on the horizon. The arrest of a prominent MP like Abib, who is known for his fiery rhetoric and controversial positions, could have far-reaching implications for the electoral landscape. Opposition parties are likely to leverage the arrest as evidence of government overreach and an attempt to stifle dissent ahead of the elections, further intensifying the political climate.
The upcoming elections in Somaliland, scheduled for November 13, 2024, represent a significant moment in the region’s political evolution. This election will encompass not only the presidential race but also parliamentary and local council elections, marking the fourth instance of universal suffrage since Somaliland’s declaration of independence from Somalia in 1991. The electoral landscape will feature candidates from three principal political parties: Kulmiye, UCID, and Waddani, each vying for influence in a climate charged with anticipation and scrutiny. Originally slated for November 2022, the elections were postponed due to a contentious extension of President Muse Bihi Abdi’s term, which has led to widespread protests and a violent crackdown by security forces. These events have raised alarm about the stability of Somaliland’s political framework, which has historically been characterized by consensus-building and peaceful transitions of power. As the country approaches this critical electoral milestone, the stakes are high, with the potential for both democratic consolidation and renewed tensions.
The popular and fiery legislator, elected from the Awdal region, has long been a lightning rod for controversy in Somaliland politics. MP Abib has been at the center of numerous heated debates, including his stance on the Somaliland-Ethiopia Memorandum of Understanding, which he initially supported before later opposing. His shifting position on this issue has drawn both support and criticism from various quarters. Most recently, he stirred further controversy with a statement regarding the Somali National Movement (SNM), the rebel group instrumental in toppling the Somali dictatorship and securing Somaliland’s independence. His remarks, perceived by some as disrespectful to the legacy of the SNM, have only added to the contentious atmosphere surrounding his political career.
Despite his often-rambunctious demeanor and penchant for making controversial statements, the exact crime MP Abib is being charged with remains unclear. The government has yet to provide a detailed account of the allegations against him. However, sources within the government, speaking on condition of strict anonymity, have accused MP Abib of committing high treason, although they have yet to present any evidence to substantiate these claims. It remains to be seen what specific charges the Attorney General will bring against MP Abib and how these charges will interact with the legal questions surrounding his parliamentary immunity.
As this high-stakes legal and political battle unfolds, the tension between Somaliland’s legislative and executive branches has become increasingly pronounced. The arrest of MP Abib has not only sparked a constitutional crisis but has also raised questions about the balance of power within Somaliland’s government. The outcome of this dispute could have far-reaching implications for the country’s legal and political systems, testing the resilience of its constitutional framework and the integrity of its democratic institutions.
On the court of public opinion, those that support the government’s position and the actions it has taken are framing the issue as not only a case of treason but also as evidence that Mr. Abib is attempting to destabilize Somaliland, much like the former Chairman of the Parliament, Mr. Abdirasak Khalif, who abandoned Somaliland and joined SSC at the beginning of the Las Anod conflict. The opposition party, Waddani, has also defended Mr. Khalif despite his clear stance against Somaliland.
For its part, the Somaliland government enjoys little confidence in its handling of legal cases or its general dispensation of justice, as evidenced by a rash of extrajudicial arrests under President Bihi. These arrests, which come with hefty charges, are often dropped within days with minimal explanation.
For now, the nation watches closely as the case of MP Mohamed Abib Yusuf continues to develop, with both sides preparing for what promises to be a protracted and contentious legal showdown.
This revision incorporates the new information provided, placing it prominently near the beginning to set the stage for the ongoing legal and political debate.
In a recent media address, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister Taye Atske-Selassie reaffirmed Ethiopia’s position on Red Sea access, stating, “There has to be safe, reliable, sustainable and durable access to and from the sea, because it’s our legitimate [need], we don’t want to be suffocated.” This powerful declaration underscores Ethiopia’s resolve to secure a “reliable and dependable independent sea outlet,” a quest that has led to the ground-breaking Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Somaliland.
#Ethiopia: “Ethiopia remains committed to peace despite hostile rhetoric from certain #Somali officials,” – Ambassador Taye Atskeselassie
In a briefing today, Foreign Minister Ambassador Taye Atskeselassie reiterated Ethiopia's unwavering commitment to peace, even in the face of… pic.twitter.com/pYb0GGmKB0
Recent developments include the appointment of Ambassador Teshome Shunde Hamito as Ethiopia’s representative to Somaliland, marking a formal step in establishing diplomatic relations. During a meeting with Somaliland’s President Muse Bihi Abdi, discussions emphasized regional security, strengthening bilateral relations, and future cooperation. This diplomatic advancement comes despite Somalia’s continued objections and Djibouti’s strategic counteroffer. It signals that Ethiopia and Somaliland are moving forward in implementing critical aspects of the MoU, undeterred by regional opposition.
Addressing the Turkish brokered talks with Somalia in Ankara, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister acknowledged progress but issued a stark warning about Somalia’s stance. “We have seen some positive developments,” he noted, but quickly added, “At the same time, we are witnessing unhelpful rhetoric and pronouncements from the Somali side.” He further emphasized, “Their hostile rhetoric and threats will not discourage Ethiopia from its commitment to peace in this region”. This pointed comment reveals Ethiopia’s growing frustration with what it perceives as obstructionist behavior from Somali officials.
Meanwhile, Djibouti has launched its own strategic maneuver. Djibouti’s Foreign Minister, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, presented Ethiopia with an enticing proposition: full management rights to Djibouti’s northern port of Tajoura. Youssouf framed this offer as a “new corridor that is already built,” emphasizing the immediacy and practicality of the solution.
"Djibouti is ready to offer Ethiopia 100% port access to defuse regional tensions," the foreign minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf told me in an exclusive interview on #FocusOnAfrica. Coincidentally he is also one of four men vying to succeed AU Chair Moussa Faki next year. pic.twitter.com/Dl6auW99Q9
However, Ethiopia’s recent actions suggest that Djibouti’s offer may indeed be too little, too late. The Ethiopian Foreign Minister’s assertion that “we have already set our direction” takes on new significance in light of Ethiopia’s commitment to diversifying maritime access options beyond its traditional reliance on Djibouti.
Adding to the complexity, Djibouti has taken assertive steps to counter Somaliland’s growing influence. Djibouti has closed Somaliland’s diplomatic mission and invited adversaries, highlighting its determination to thwart Somaliland’s emerging strategic competition. This aggressive stance underscores Djibouti’s intent to maintain control over regional maritime access and keep Ethiopia as a landlocked customer, rather than offering genuine access to the Red Sea.
Moreover, Djibouti is also competing for the African Union chairmanship, although its prospects may not be as bright against East Africa’s venerable elder statesman, Mr. Raila Odinga. This adds another layer to Djibouti’s aggressive regional posturing, as it seeks to maintain its strategic significance amidst rising competition.
The economic implications of this diplomatic chess game are immense. Ethiopia stands to save up to $1 billion annually in logistics costs by diversifying its sea access. Conversely, Djibouti faces potential economic upheaval, with port-related revenues accounting for nearly 80% of its GDP. Djibouti’s recent actions further cast doubt on its reliability as a partner for Ethiopia, indicating a preference for keeping Ethiopia dependent on its ports rather than facilitating true maritime access.
As these events unfold, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister’s words resonate with particular gravity: “This is about the future of our nation and the prosperity of our people.” It’s clear that Ethiopia views its maritime strategy as non-negotiable and is taking concrete steps to implement its vision.
As Ethiopia pushes forward with its ambitious plans, seemingly undeterred by Somalia’s objections or Djibouti’s counteroffers, the region finds itself at a critical juncture. The decisions and actions taken in the coming months have the potential to fundamentally reshape the economic, diplomatic, and security landscape of the entire Horn of Africa for years to come. The world watches closely as this high-stakes maritime diplomacy unfolds, with the stability and prosperity of the region hanging in the balance.
In the intricate chess game of Horn of Africa geopolitics, Somalia has embraced a strategy so myopic that it threatens to reduce the entire region to ashes. At the heart of this perilous gambit lies a zero-sum mentality that has consumed Mogadishu’s political elite, driving the nation to the brink of self-immolation. The catalyst? The specter of Somaliland’s potential recognition.
The possibility of Ethiopia recognizing Somaliland in exchange for port access and a military base has triggered a paroxysm of irrational fear in Somalia. In the eyes of Mogadishu’s power brokers, Somaliland’s gain is inevitably Somalia’s loss, a simplistic calculus that fails to account for the nuances of regional cooperation and mutual benefit. This zero-sum perspective has become the lens through which Somalia views all regional developments, driving it towards increasingly desperate measures. In its frenzied attempt to thwart Somaliland’s aspirations, Somalia has cast reason to the wind, embracing alliances that promise short-term obstruction at the cost of long-term stability.
Like a wounded animal attracting predators, Somalia’s stench of desperation has drawn the attention of opportunistic powers. Egypt and Turkey have descended upon the war-torn nation, each eager to exploit Somalia’s vulnerability for their own gain. The agreement with Turkey, granting Ankara access to 30% of Somalia’s maritime resources, exemplifies this desperate ploy. This deal not only compromises Somalia’s economic future but also risks entangling it in broader geopolitical conflicts. Turkey’s interest in Somalia is purely commercial, having already secured control over Mogadishu’s airport and port, the two largest sources of income for a country heavily reliant on donor nations. The recent military pact with Ankara further cements Turkey’s grip on Somalia’s vital infrastructure, signaling a troubling trend of external dependency.
The courtship of Egypt, a nation with its own axe to grind against Ethiopia, is a prime example of this reckless strategy. By inviting Egyptian influence into the region, Somalia hopes to create a counterweight to Ethiopian-Somaliland cooperation. Yet in doing so, it has opened Pandora’s box, potentially unleashing forces far beyond its control. Egypt’s primary motive for deepening its involvement in Somalia is rooted in the contentious Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) project on the Blue Nile. Egypt, which relies on the Nile for over 90% of its water supply, views the GERD as a dire threat to its water security. By expanding its influence in Somalia, Egypt aims to pressure Ethiopia from multiple fronts, despite Ethiopia’s homecourt advantage and established security buffer zones along their border. The assumption that Egypt can project meaningful power against Ethiopia under these conditions is a strategic miscalculation on Somalia’s part.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia and Somaliland forge ahead with plans for economic integration and shared development. The Port of Berbera in Somaliland, which could serve as a catalyst for regional growth, is seen by Mogadishu not as an opportunity for collaboration but as a threat to be neutralized at all costs. The Ethiopia-Somaliland Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) goes beyond mere port access. It envisions a comprehensive partnership, including economic cooperation, infrastructure development, and potentially, a path to Somaliland’s recognition. This agreement represents a fundamentally different approach to regional politics, one that prioritizes mutual benefits over zero-sum calculations.
Another regional player, Djibouti, has made its disapproval of the MoU very clear. Djibouti, long accustomed to its role as Ethiopia’s primary access to the sea, views the potential diversion of Ethiopian traffic to Somaliland’s ports as an existential threat to its economic lifeline. The loss of its presumed outsized influence over Somaliland also vanishing into thin air did not help President Guelleh’s delicate sensibility. This opposition underscores the far-reaching implications of the Ethiopia-Somaliland agreement, which has the potential to reshape regional economic dynamics and power balances.
Somalia’s fanatical leadership, hailing these alliances as major successes and its troll factory on social media framing them as though Somalia has become a nuclear power and threatening Ethiopia and Somaliland with annihilation presumably with Egyptian and Turkish muscle, but are oblivious to the inferno they are stoking and the new alliances forming around them. Each move to undermine Somaliland’s position is viewed as a victory in a game where the only acceptable outcome is total domination. Yet with each such “victory,” Somalia edges closer to a precipice from which there may be no return.
Compounding its status as a failed state with all accounts dealing with resurgent Al-Shabaab that is capable of attacking targets in Mogadishu’s presumably secure areas, Somalia has become a vector for instability, its leaders invoking past hostilities between Somalia and Ethiopia and even threatening to partner with same terror groups and relitigate issues of mythical lost Somali lands. But the most egregious is inviting external powers that have zero interest in seeing Somalia succeed in any meaningful way.
The tragedy is compounded by the missed opportunities for genuine regional cooperation. A Somalia secure in its own sovereignty and willing to engage constructively with its neighbors could serve as a cornerstone of stability in the Horn of Africa. Instead, it has chosen a path of confrontation and self-destruction, risking not only its own future but the stability of the entire region.
As the situation intensifies, crucial questions loom: Will Somalia recognize the folly of its approach before it’s too late? Will it continue its self-destructive path, so consumed by its obsession with dragging Somaliland into the fiery gutter that it fails to see the danger to its own future? And how will the opposition from Djibouti and the deepening partnership between Ethiopia and Somaliland reshape the regional balance of power?
The answers to these questions may well determine the fate of the entire Horn of Africa for generations to come. The region stands at a crossroads, and the path chosen in the coming months could either lead to a new era of cooperation and prosperity or plunge the Horn into a maelstrom of conflict from which it may not easily emerge. As Ethiopia and Somaliland take concrete steps towards realizing their partnership, the pressure on Somalia to reconsider its destructive course only intensifies. The coming days and weeks may prove crucial in determining whether reason and cooperation will prevail over the politics of division and self-immolation.
August 26, 2024 – Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group (SL-SAG) stands firmly with Somaliland, a nation that has shown resilience, stability, and a commitment to progress. As a former British protectorate that gained independence in 1960, Somaliland’s history has been shaped by a determination to forge its own path. Since declaring its restoration day on May 18, 1991, Somaliland has demonstrated remarkable strides in governance, security/peace, economic development, and international diplomacy.
Despite its impressive achievements, Somaliland continues to face unjust interference from Somalia, which seeks to undermine its sovereignty. Somalia’s recent efforts to disrupt Somaliland’s progress, particularly in response to Somaliland’s strategic partnership with Ethiopia, reflect a campaign to derail the region’s development and bid for international recognition.
Somaliland’s agreement to allow Ethiopia to establish a naval base on its shores in exchange for a stake in the national carrier is a visionary move, aimed at boosting Somaliland’s economy and solidifying its position as a regional power. This deal underscores Somaliland’s independence, far-sighted leadership, and commitment to securing its future.
Somalia’s attempts to claim Somaliland as its own and to pressure airlines like Flydubai and Ethiopian Airlines to alter their flight operations is nothing more than a thinly veiled effort to destabilize Somaliland’s efforts towards growth and international recognition. We congratulate and support Somaliland’s Civil Aviation Authority, which has full sovereignty over its airspace and has effectively governed it.
SL-SAG recognizes that Somaliland has proven itself as a beacon of stability in the Horn of Africa. Its regular elections, strong institutions, and economic resilience set it apart as a nation that should be supported, not undermined. We reject Somalia’s baseless claims of sovereignty and call upon the international community to stand with Somaliland in its pursuit of recognition as an independent state.
The suspension of Flydubai flights to Mogadishu due to security concerns underscores the contrast between Somaliland’s stability and Somalia’s ongoing instability. Somaliland offers a vision of peace, development, and progress, while Somalia continues to grapple with conflict and internal challenges.
SL-SAG calls on all nations, institutions, and businesses to recognize Somaliland’s sovereignty and engage with it as a stable, forward-looking nation. We urge the international community to support Somaliland’s development and reinforce its rightful place in the global arena.
We stand with Somaliland in its quest for peace, prosperity, and recognition. Somaliland is not just an enclave—it is a nation with a proud history and a bright future.
Contact Information: Somaliland Strategic Advisory Group (SL-SAG) Website: www.slsag.org
Since the conclusion of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between #Somaliland and #Ethiopia on 1st January 2024, forces against the very existence of Somaliland have emerged.
The objective of the defense deal signed by #Turkey and #Somalia is to invade the territory of Somaliland. Moreover, Egypt and Somalia similarly concluded a defense pact to wage war on Somaliland. These new unholy alliances that Somalia has entered with Turkey and Egypt are all attempts to thwart the successful implementation of the MoU between Somaliland and Ethiopia and to undermine the interests of the two neighboring countries.
It is true that Somaliland’s lack of recognition hinders its access to international forums, particularly intergovernmental organizations. Nonetheless, with its full sovereign and effective control over its territory, including its sea, Somaliland is fully prepared and resolute in defending its dignity. It unequivocally rejects any interference from #Mogadishu, #Cairo, #Ankara, or any other state or non-state actor.
It is crucial to note that Ethiopia should fully stand up for Somaliland, whom many actors are trying to punish because of the MoU it signed with Ethiopia. As a key stakeholder, Somaliland should be an integral part of and participate in any talks concerning the MoU. We are not going to wait and see. We should sit at the table and air our voices. Only Somaliland can grant or refuse to grant access to the sea. The absence of Somaliland makes these takes doomed to fail.
In fact, Somalia should know better. Egypt does not have Somalia’s interests at heart. It only intends to use Somalia’s territory for its war over the Nile River. Turkey is there to advance its interests in Somalia and Ethiopia. The people of Somalia have been struggling with foreign interventions and proxy wars for the past three decades. It is up to them to accept a new front of proxy war.
However, one crystal clear thing is that Somalilanders will sacrifice their lives to defend their interests and dignity. And we are going to win. The friends of Somaliland – the UK and the US in particular – should not watch from a distance the alliances forming against Somaliland. They should know that Somaliland is a strong state with solid foundations. We are a reliable friend who can be counted on the bad days.
About the Author
Mohamed Hussein Jama (Rambo) is a Member of the House of Representatives representing Maroodijeeh region. Mr. Jama is a seasoned journalist and formerly newspaper Editor-in-Chief and civil society leader
